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THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISCLOSURE DUTY
AND THE JENCKS ACT
DAVID B. WExLmR *t
INTRODUOTION
A OTING principally to clarify the Supreme Court's
holding in Jencks v. United States,' Congress in 1957
passed the Jencks Act' - a discovery vehicle which enables
federal criminal defendants to obtain from the prosecution
information possibly useful during cross-examination to im-
peach the credibility of Government witnesses.3 In general,
the act provides that after a Government witness testifies on
direct examination, the accused in a federal prosecution is
entitled, upon request, to all statements previously made by
that witness to an agent of the Government which relate to
the subject matter of the witness's trial testimony.4  "State-
ment" is defined technically in the act to encompass only
written statements signed or adopted by the witness,' and
substantially verbatim recordings of oral statements, recorded
contemporaneously with the making of the oral statements.'
Should the prosecution fail to deliver the statutory state-
* B.A., Harpur College; LL.B., New York University; Attorney, Legisla-
tion and Special Projects Section, Criminal Division, United States Depart-
ment of Justice.
j- The opinions expressed in this article are the personal views of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States
Department of Justice.
1 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
2 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). The complete text of the Jencks Act appears
in the appendix to this article.
3 A comprehensive discussion of the Jencks Act appears in Note, The
Jencks Act: After Six Years, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1133 (1963). An earlier
noteworthy study is Comment, The Jencks Legislation: Problems in Prospect,
67 YALE L.J. 674 (1958).
4 No preliminary showing of inconsistency between the sought-after
document and the witness's direct examination testimony is necessary for
production.
518 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1) (1964).
8 18 U.S.C. §3500(e) (2 ) (1964).
THE JENCKS ACT
ments to the defendant, the act dictates striking from the
record the Government witness's testimony or, in rare
instances, declaring a mistrial.
The act, together with the accompanying gloss of case
law, establishes rather well-defined limitations on the scope
of the Jencks discovery right. An emerging body of con-
stitutional law requiring prosecutors to disclose evidence fav-
orable to the accused,' however, seems to be formulating,
to some extent unwittingly, a governmental duty to reveal
evidence of impeachment value which goes beyond the
bounds of the Jencks Act. The present article will examine
the possible effect of that body of law on Jencks Act
discovery.
THE CONSnTIUTIONAL DISCLOSUl DUTY AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO THE JENOKS ACT
Recognizing a prosecutor's role as a public official rather
than as a mere adversary,' the courts, under the due process
clause of the Constitution, have imposed on prosecutors a
duty to disclose to defendants evidence which might aid the
accused in securing an acquittal.' Supreme Court involve-
7 E.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See generally Note,
The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 CoLum.
L. Rev. 858 (1960) ; Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an Accused,
34 F.R.D. 87 (1964); Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to
Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YAL. L.J. 136 (1964).
sThe classic statement to that effect is the oft-quoted passage in
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935): "The United States
Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done."
9E.g., Brady v. Maryland, supra note 7; Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S.
607 (1960) (per curiam) ; Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) ; Alcorta v.
Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (per curiam); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213
(1942); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955); United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi,
195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953); People v.
Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956). The
cases have elevated to a constitutional plane the portion of Canon 5 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which relates to public prosecutors. ("The
primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict,
but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting
of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
1966 ]
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ment in the area can be traced back some thirty years
when, in Mooney v. Holoha,' ° it held the fourteenth amend-
ment violated where a state won a conviction through the
knowing use of perjured testimony."
. Using Mooney as a springboard, the Court has required
prosecutors to correct false testimony given by Government
witnesses even when the Government had not solicited the
false testimony,1 2 and has proscribed the suppression of evi-
dence capable of exonerating the accused. 3 It has become
settled, too, that suppression cannot be justified on the
ground that the withheld evidence relates only to the weak
credibility of a Government witness, rather than directly
to the defendant's innocence.'
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement of the
disclosure duty came in 1963 when, over the objection of
Justice White who would have employed "more confining
language and would not [have] cast in constitutional form
a broad rule of criminal discovery," " the Court in Brady
reprehensible.") Cf. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961);
United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961)
(broad disclosure duty imposed by the supervisory power of the federal
courts over the administration of criminal justice).
10 294 U.S. 103 (1935). For a good discussion of the Mooney case, see
Cahn, Low in the Consuner Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 7-9
(1963).
11 "[Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied
by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the
pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving
a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury
by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured." Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
12 Alcorta v. Texas, supra note 9; Napue v. Illinois, supra note 9.
13 Pyle v. Kansas, supra note 9; Wilde v. Wyoming, szpra note 9.
14 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) ("The jury's estimate of
the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative
of guilt or innocence . . . .") ; United States e.x rel. Bund v. LaVallee, 344 F.2d
313, 315 (2d Cir. 1965) ; United States ez rel. Rohrlich v. Fay, 240 F. Supp.
848 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ; United States ex rel. Hicks v. Fay, 230 F. Supp. 942
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); Smallwood v. Warden, 205 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1962). See
also United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., supra note 9; People
v. Savvides, supra note 9. Cf. Mesarosh v. United States. 352 U.S. 1, 9
(1956) (psychiatric condition of Government witness resulted in his giving
false testimony); Comment, 58 MIcH. L. Rxv. 888, 895 n.33 (1960).
15 Brady v. Maryland, stipra note 7, at 92 (White, J., concurring). It is
hard to disagree with Justice White, or with Justices Black and Harlan
(dissenting), that the due process question was not properly before the-
Brady Court.
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v. Maryland " fashioned a sweeping governmental disclosure
obligation:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 7
Decisions subsequent to Brady have read that case expan-
sively; " the ninth circuit in Thomas v. United States 9 for
example, citing Brady as authority, invoked the "well-recog-
nized rule . . . that a conviction cannot stand where a
prosecutor has, either wilfully or negligently, withheld ma-
terial evidence favorable to the defendant." 20
The constitutional disclosure duty affects the Jencks
Act machinery because the former mandates governmental
divulgence of impeachment evidence." The theoretical impact
is easily demonstrable: after a Government witness testifies
on direct examination, all pretrial statements made by that
witness which are at variance with his trial testimony, or
which otherwise bear disfavorably on his credibility, become
evidence which will aid the accused in securing an acquittal,
and are, therefore, seemingly subject to discovery under
Brady's broad disclosure rule as a matter of due process,2
without regard to the producibility restrictions which inhere
in the Jencks Act.2 3
1N Brady v. Maryland, supra note 7.
"I Id. at 87.
1s E.g., Thomas v, United States, 343 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1965); Barbee
v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964), 25 MD. L. RmV. 79 (1965);
United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964),
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 565 (1964), 38 TuL. L. R-v. 759 (1964).
10 343 F2d 49 (9th Cir. 1965).
20 Id. at 53.
21 See cases cited note 14, supra.
22 The principal cases dealing with the constitutional disclosure duty
have all imposed the duty on state prosecutors via the fourteenth amendment.
Since the duty has been deemed so fundamental as to bind the states,
it is a fortiori applicable to federal prosecutors under the fifth amendment.
Cases involving federal prosecutors include Taylor v. United States, 229
F.2d 826 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986 (1956); Kyle v. United
States, supra note 9 (supervisory power); United States v. Consolidated
Laundries Corp., supra note 9 (supervisory power). See also Berger v.
United States, supra note 8.
23 The courts and the commentators are beginning to recognize the re-
lationship between the two areas of law. See United States ex rel. Bund
1966 ]
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THE) Docm NAT, ImPAcT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIswsuRE
DUTY ON JEiNCKS ACT DiscovERY
An across-the-board application of the constitutional dis-
closure duty to situations involving credibility evidence will
yield a body of impeachment discovery rules considerably
broader than those established by the Jencks Act. This
section will focus upon some of the specific changes which
would. be wrought by the blanket superimposition of Brady
on the Jencks domain.
Statement" as a Word of Art
Subsections (e) (1) and (e) (2) of the Jencks Act 24
define the term "statement," as employed in that act, as
written statements signed or approved by the witness,25
and as substantially verbatim and contemporaneously tran-
scribed recordings of oral statements. In Palermo v. United
States2 7 when the act first reached the Supreme Court for
interpretation, Justice Frankfurter expressed the opinion
that a defendant had no right, under non-Jencks procedures,
to inspect unauthenticated or non-statutory statements--those
falling without the subsection (e) definitions. He remarked,
obiter, that "statements of a government witness made to an
agent of the Government which cannot be produced under
the [definitional] terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 cannot be pro-
duced at all." 28
v. LaVallee, sapra note 14; Application of Kapatos, silpra note 14; LOCKHART,
KAMISAR & CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LiBmrms 246 (1964);
Recommnended Procedures in Criminal Pretrials, 37 F.R.D. 95 n.1 (1965);
Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
228, 242 (1964). Cf. Comment, supra note 14.
24 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1) and (e) (2) (1964).
25 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1) (1964).
26 18 U.S.C. §3500(e) (2 ) (1964).
27 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
28 Id. at 351. The Justice rejected, therefore, the "suggestion that the
detailed statutory procedures restrict only the production of the type of state-
ment described in subsection (e), leaving all other statements, e.g., non-
verbatim, non-contemporaneous records of oral statements, to be produced
under pre-existing rules of procedure . . . ." Id. at 349. Justices Brennan,
Warren, Black and Douglas, concurring in Palermo, felt the Court should
not have reridered gratuitously a dissertation on the producibility of non-
Jencks documents. Id. at 361. They were concerned, moreover, that the
rule espoused by the majority's dictum could not comport with the con-
frontation and compulsory process rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Id.
at 362.
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With the advent of Brady, it appears the Palermo dictum
must be discarded; 29 the constitutional disclosure duty cases
would seem to require the divulgence of statements containing
matter favorable to the defense irrespective of the conformity
of those statements to the Jencks authenticity standards."
To the comfort of at least four Justices, it should be noted
that if a Government witness testifies at length as to his
knowledge of the defendant's alleged criminal act, "a mem-
orandum of a government agent simply stating that [the
witness had been] interrogated for several hours as to his
knowledge of the defendant's alleged criminal transactions
[and had] denied any knowledge of them" 31 will fall within
Brady's constitutional discovery ambit.
Widely accepted by the courts, especially since Brady,
is the rule that a conviction will not be saved by a prosecutor's
honest but incorrect belief that certain evidence withheld by
20 It is interesting, and surprising, to note that both Palermo and Napue
v. Illinois, supra note 9, a leading constitutional disclosure case, were decided
within a week of each other. Their overlapping nature went unnoticed
by the Palermo Court.
30 In Alcorta v. Texas, supra note 9, for example, the prosecutor before
trial made notes of an interview he had with the state's chief witness;
those notes, containing information which would have been useful for
impeachment and for buttressing the defense's affirmative allegations, were
withheld by the prosecutor. Presumably, the disclosure of the information
contained in those notes-whether substantially verbatim and contemporaneously
recorded or not-would have accorded the defendant the due process of
law which the Supreme Court held he had been denied.
Although Alcorta involved a state prosecution, to which the Jencks Act
was not applicable, the Supreme Court, in fashioning a constitutional discovery
rule, did not establish a disclosure exemption for statements which do not
live up to reliability standards analogous to those prescribed by subsection
(e)'For the English practice of disclosing prior statements of witnesses
containing matter favorable to the accused, see Traynor, Ground Lost and
Found in Criminal Discovery in England, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 749, 765-67
(1964).
31 Palermo v. United States, supra note 27, at 361-62 (concurring opinion
of Justices Brennan, Warren, Black and Douglas). The concurring Justices
were disturbed that such a memorandum does not meet the authenticity
requirements of subsection (e). See Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S.
487 (1963), for another example of a marked variance between a Government
witness's trial testimony and his pretrial statement. In Campbell, however,
after much litigation, the pretrial statement was held producible under the
Jencks procedure. For a good discussion of the Campbell case and its
history, see Note, The Jencks Act: After Six Years, 38 N.Y.U.L. Ray
1133, 1142-43 (1963).
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him would not have aided the defendant ;32 defense counsel,
rather than the prosecutor or the court, is considered the
best judge of the usefulness of the evidence." When this rule
is coupled with the theory that statements containing in-
formation useful to the defense are discoverable, whether or
not they are Jencks documents, as a constitutional ingredient
of a fair trial, Brady's liberalizing effect on the discovery
process is made apparent.,
Thus, if after direct examination of a Government wit-
ness, the Government admits the existence of a pretrial
statement but denies its authenticity, the court will hold a
hearing or voir di6re to determine whether the document
comports with the producibility requirements of subsection
(e)." Should the court decide that the document falls
without section 3500, defense counsel could nevertheless make
a Brady-request for the identical document, which should be
complied with if the statement contains information ma-
terially advantageous to the defendant. If the Government
or court persists in denying discovery of the document on
32 Pre-Brady cases recognizing the rule include United States ex rel.
Thompson v. Dye, .tpra note 9 (heavily relied upon by the Supreme Court
in Brady); Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; and the
Jencks case itself, supra note 1. The Griffin court emphasized "the neces-
sity of disclosure by the prosecution of evidence that may reasonably be
considered admissible and useful to the defense. When there is substantial
room for doubt, the prosecution is not to decide for the court what is
admissible or for the defense what is useful." 183 F.2d at 993.
By explaining the principle underlying the disclosure duty to be "not
punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an
unfair trial to the accused," 373 U.S. at 87, and by holding suppressions of
evidence favorable to an accused violative of due process "irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution," ibid., Brady put the finishing
touches on the rule that a prosecutor should disclose, at least to the court,
all evidence which might in some way reasonably aid the defendant. See
Barbee v. Warden, mtpra note 18, at 845; United States ex rel. Meers v.
Wilkins, supra note 18, at 137; Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963).
33 The difficulty of the task to which the prosecutor is put is under-
scored by the fact that even pretrial statements which seem consistent with
a witness' trial testimony may have impeachment value. As the Jencks
Court noted: "Flat contradiction between the witness' testimony and the
version of the events given in his reports is not the only test of inconsistency.
The omission from the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contrast
in emphasis upon the same facts, even a different order of treatment, are
also relevant to the cross-examining process of testing the credibility of a
witness' trial testimony." Jencks v. United States, sMpra note 1, at
667.
3 Campbell v. United States, suipra note 31, t 494.
[ VOL. 40
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the ground that it does not contain matter useful to the
defense, the document could be preserved for the appellate
review of its useful nature." An honest but wrongful guess
by a prosecutor or district court on the "usefulness" issue
could result in the reversal or the setting aside of a
conviction. 6
Statement Must Be Made "to an Agent of the Government"
Under the Jencks Act, pretrial statements of Govern-
ment witnesses, "whether within subsection (e) (1) or sub-
section (e) (2), are producible only if made to a Government
agent." 7 This is abundantly clear from the legislative
history," although the face of the statute, at least with
regard to subsection (e) (1) statements, is somewhat am-
biguous."s One commentator 4" posed the question "whether
'statements' made by a government witness to a state investi-
gative official should be made available to a defendant in
cases where the 'statements' have been turned over to the
federal government to aid it in the prosecution of the case." "'
From the legislative history of the Jencks Act, it would
appear that statements made to state investigators would not
be producible unless, perhaps, the federal government had
been involved in the state inquiry from its inception. Under
such circumstances, it is arguable that the state officials
would, for the purposes of disclosure, be deemed agents of
the federal government.2
35 Cf. Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 34 F.R.D.
87 (1964). See also Recommended Procedures in Criminal Pretrials, 37 F.R.D.
95 (1965).
36 See notes 32 and 33 supra, and accompanying text.
37 Note, The Jencks Act: After Six Years, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1133,
1134 (1963).
38 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1870 (report to House managers).
39 "Subsection (a), like subsection (e) (2), refers to statements or reports
made to an agent of the Government. Subsection (e) (1), however, which
deals with the authentication of oral statements, does not by its letter
require that the producible statement be made to a Government agent. This
source of constructional confusion is due only to a lack of careful drafts-
manship, and a literal reading of the statute would prove unwise." Note,
The Jencks Act: After Six Years, 38 N.Y.U.L. RLv. 1133, 1134 (1963).
40 Borillo, Section 3500: Justice on a Tightrope, 45 MARQ. L. RM% 205
(1961).
42 Id. at 213. (Emphasis in original.)
42 See United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 960 (1965).
1966]
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Under Brady, and the other constitutional disclosure
duty cases, the person to whom the witness's pretrial state-
ment was directed is entirely irrelevant-if such a statement
contains information of impeachment value, or if it is
otherwise useful to the defendant's case, and if the statement
at the time of trial is in the possession of the Government, 3
disclosure by the Government to the defense seems neces-
sary." In United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp.,45
for example, a new trial was granted because it was shown
that the prosecution had negligently suppressed, among other
things, a letter in its possession from an important Govern-
ment witness to the telephone company."
Statement Must "Relate to the Subject Matter" of the
Witness's Testimony
To be producible under the Jencks Act, a Government
witness's pretrial statement must "relate to the subject
matter" of his trial testimony. If the Government ac-
knowledges the existence of a pretrial statement, but claims
that it does not meet this relevancy test, the act dictates a
judicial in camera determination of relevancy; the district
43 The constitutional disclosure duty decisions might call for overturning
a conviction for failure to reveal evidence to the defense even when the
prosecuting attorney is unaware of that evidence, so long as some part of
the Government, or at least the prosecuting arm of the Government-such as
the police-is in possession of the information. See, e.g., Barbee v. Warden,
supra note 18, at 846: "Nor is the effect- of the nondisclosure neutralized
because the prosecuting attorney was not shown to have had knowledge of
the exculpatory evidence. Failure of the police to reveal such material
evidence in their possession is equally harmful to a defendant whether the
information is purposely, or- negligently, withheld. And it makes -no-difference
if- the withholding is by officials other than the prosecutor. The police
are also part of the prosecution, and the taint on the trial is no less
if they, rather than the State's Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure."
See Cahn, Law hP the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 9-12
(1963). See also Application of Kapatos, spra note 14, at 888: "I do not
think that an accused's rights as defined by Napue should depend on the
fortuitous circumstance that the district attorney who conducts the investigation
also conducts the prosecution . ... "
44 See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., mpra note 9.
Although often cited together with due process suppression cases, Consolidated
Laundries was actually decided pursuant to the court's supervisory power
over criminal justice.
45 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961).
46 Id. at 568-69.
47 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1964).
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court is to excise matter deemed irrelevant to the witness's
trial testimony and direct the Government to deliver the
remainder of the statement to the accused.," If no portion
of the pretrial statement meets the test of relevancy, the
entire statement, even if it is a signed or verbatim document,
will be shielded from the defendant's reach. 9
Because of the relevancy formula, certain types of im-
peachment evidence-such as those statements showing a
witness's bias or propensity to lie-are presumably not dis-
coverable under the Jencks Act,10 for, unlike prior inconsistent
statements, those types of statements technically do not
relate to the subject matter of the witness's trial testimony. 1
48 Ibid. "If, pursuant to such procedure, any portion of such statement
is withheld from the defendant and the defendant objects to such withholding,
and the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant,
the entire text of such statement shall be preserved by the United States and,
in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made available to the appellate
court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the ruling of the
trial judge."
49The Supreme Court touched upon the Jencks relevancy standards in
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
50 Comment, The Jencks Legislation: Problems it Prospect, 67 YALE
L.J. 674, 693-95 (1958). See 4 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACtiCE
AND PRocEauan §2183.1 (Supp. 1964): "Documents may well exist which
would show bias or otherwise be useful in attacking the credibility of the
witness, but which do not relate to the subject matter of his testimony at the
trial. The procedure for inspection which the statute provides does not apply
to such documents." Cf. United States v. Soto, 256 F.2d 729 (7th Cir.
1958). See also United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963); United States v. Simmons, 281 F.2d 354(2d Cir. 1959), aff'd en banc, 281 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1960), where the
second circuit held beyond the purview of the Jencks Act statements which
are "collateral" or "incidental" to the witness's trial testimony. Those
cases are pertinent because "a situation could arise where a witness'
statement might be purely collateral and yet be relevant for impeachment
purposes." Note, The Jencks Right: Judicial and Legislative Modifications,
the States and the Future, 50 VA. L. Rxv. 535, 542 (1964). That author
presents an interesting example. Ibid.
51 A somewhat liberal interpretation of the Tencks relevancy test, how-
ever, was provided by the Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. United States,
360 U.S. 366 (1959). That case held that "a statement by a witness that
she fears her memory as to the events at issue was poor certainly 'relates
to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified' and should have
been given to defendant" Id. at 370. (Emphasis added.) Accord, Ogden
v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 739 n.55 (9th Cir. 1962). Note, however,
that a statement regarding a witness's poor memory in general, as opposed to
a poor recollection as to the events at issue, would probably not meet
the Jencks relevancy standard even as interpreted by Rosenberg. Similarly,
a statement regarding a witness's bias in the particular case might be
producible under Jencks (United States v. Borelli, supra note 42), although
a statement to the effect that a witness is prejudiced against a particular
1966 ]
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The relevancy limitation, however, plays no part in framing
the constitutional disclosure duty; that duty directs the prose-
cutorial divulgence of evidence bearing disfavorably on the
credibility of witnesses without regard to the specific subject
matter of their trial testimony.2 The mere fact that the
witness is testifying against the defendant is presumably
sufficient to set into operation the duty to disclose informa-
tion materially affecting the former's credibility. 3
Statement Must Be "Requested
As a prerequisite to the Government's obligation to pro-
duce a witness's pretrial statements pursuant to the Jencks
Act procedure, subsection (b) requires the defendant, after
the witness has testified on direct examination, to move
for the production of those statements. The requirement
of a demand has been construed strictly; without a motion
from defense counsel, the Government's retention of statutory
statements will not be deemed wrongful." foreover, al-
racial group presumably would not "relate to the subject matter" of his
testimony, even were the defendant a member of that racial group.
52 See, e.g., United States ex tel. Hicks v. Fay, supra note 14 (prosecutor
suppressed fact that important Government witness was insane). See also
Mesarosh v. United States, supra note 14.
5 The evidence subject to disclosure might be a pretrial statement made
by the witness. United States ex rel. Bund v. LaVallee, supra note 14;
Application of Kapatos, supra note 14. It is important to note that the
evidence may take many other forms as well. Hence, information obtained
from third parties (non-witnesses) calling int6 question the witness's credibility
should be made available to the defense, United States ex rel. Meers v.
Wilkins, supra note 18; Application of Kapatos, supra note 14; Smallwood
v. Warden, supra note 14 (state in rape prosecution suppressed evidence
acquired from a physician as to prosecuting witness's bad moral reputation
and history of venereal disease); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye,
supra note 9. Cf. United States ex rel. Rohrlich v. Fay, supra note 14.
In England, "the prosecution also makes ready disclosure of any criminal
records of prosecution witnesses that might be useful to the defense for
impeachment." Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Crimdinal Discovery in
England, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rm,. 749, 763 (1964).
Even if pretrial remarks of witnesses indicating bias were ordinarily
producible under the Jencks Act (ef. United States v. Borelli, supra note 42),
non-compliance with other Jencks requirements would render the information
unavailable under the act. But that evidence would, of course, be discoverable
under Brady.
54 Ogden v. United States, supra note, 51; United States v. Grabina, 295
F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1961), vacated and remanded for resentencing, 369 U.S.
426 (1962) (per curiam) ; United States v. Simmons, supra note 50, at 358;
Johnston v. United States, 260 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 935 (1959): United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 449 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821 (1958).
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though the request need not mention the Jencks Act by
name,' 5 the request must be specific in nature." It is clear,
too, that a premature demand is insufficient."
The necessity of a request with regard to the consti-
tutional disclosure duty has not achieved the status of its
Jencks Act counterpart; in fact, it would seem that a
demand is not essential to spark the evidentiary production
of matter favorable to the accused. Although Brady used
the term "request" in framing its disclosure rule," cases
decided subsequent to Brady have plainly held defense dis-
covery demands unnecessary." In United States ex rel.
Mfeers v. Wiltkins,"0 for example, the second circuit noted:
The case before us differs from Brady in that the defense counsel
here never requested the disclosure of evidence from the prosecutor,
but we think that such a request is not a sine qua non to establish
a duty on the prosecution's part.'-
Similarly, in an opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Judge Sobeloff in Barbee v. Warden " held:
It is no answer that Barbee's attorney failed to ask for the [with-
held evidence]. . . .While a diligent defense counsel might have
learned about the police reports, this is too speculative a consideration
to outweigh any unfairness that actually resulted at the trial.63
5 Howard v. United States, 282 F.2d 648 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 879 (1960).
56 United States v. Klinghoffer Bros. Realty Corp., 285 F.2d 487, 493
(2d Cir. 1960). See also Foster v. United States, 308 F.2d 751, 755 (8th
Cir. 1962) (request must be for "statements" rather than for the Govern-
ment's "file").
57 Rich v. United States, 261 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 946 (1959). Johnston v. United States, supra note 54.
s 'Ve now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. MNaryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
(Emphasis added.)
59 United States ex rel. Mfeers v. Wilkins, supra note 18; Barbee v.
Warden, supra note 18.
O6 Supra note 18.
OL United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, supra note 18, at 137. See
Comment, Prosecutor Held to Have Duty to Disclose Material Exculpatory
Evidence Without Prior Defense Request, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 565 (1964).
62 Supra note 18.
603 Id. at 845.
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Even the cases relied upon in Brady as expressing "the
correct constitutional rule" 64 neither involved nor mentioned
defense requests. 5 Once again, then, Brady exceeds the
Jencks Act in disclosure liberality.6
"Grand Jury Minutes" Eivcluded From the Jencks Act
Procedure
Consisting as it does of an entire body of law in its
own right, the law governing the producibility of grand jury
minutes cannot in this article be dealt with at any great
length. But because of its close relationship with both the
Jencks Act and Brady discovery procedures, at least some
" Brady v. Maryland, snpra note 58, at 86.
65 United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955); United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi,
195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953). "In fact,
the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Brady [226 Md. 422,
174 A.2d 167], which the Supreme Court affirmed, was not framed in terms
of the necessity of a request." Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 565, 566
(1964). See also Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
1, 11 (1963).
66 If, therefore, the Government is in possession of a witness's pretrial
statements which are favorable to the defense (e.g., statements materially
inconsistent with the witness's trial testimony) the prosecutor, with or without
a defense motion, would seem to be obliged to reveal that evidence. Cf.
United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661, 668 (2d Cir. 1959) : "The prosecutor
must be vigilant to see to it that full disclosure is made at trial of whatever
may be in his possession which bears in any material degree on the charge
for which a defendant is tried." See Comment, 58 MIcH. L. REv. 888,
895 n.33 (1960). If a defendant, after conviction, learns of the wrongful
suppression, he can move for a new trial (see United States v. Consolidated
Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961)), or attack his conviction col-
laterally under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507 (2d
Cir. 1961)). Even if the courts should retain a demand requirement, a
blanket Brady request will presumably suffice (see Carter, Suppression of
Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 34 F.R.D. 87 (1964)), and "evidence which
is discovered subsequent to the request [e.g., after the demand, a witness
testifies in a manner inconsistent with his pretrial statement, thereby making
the latter useful to the defense] would have to be disclosed voluntarily by
the prosecutor . .. ." Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. R~v. 565, 567 n.17 (1964).
It should be noted, too, that under Jencks, when a statement is turned
over to defense counsel, he is given the task of rummaging through the
document (a recess is held if necessary) to find possible inconsistencies.
But in light of Meers and Barbee, which seek in part to relieve a defendant
from the burdens which often flow from having a less than diligent defense
counsel (cf. Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 565-66 (1964)), the constitutional
disclosure duty may require a prosecutor who is aware of specific incon-
sistencies to disclose their existence. Cf. United States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d
338, 342 (2d Cir. 1958).
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attention must be devoted to the disclosure at trial of a
witness's prior testimony before a grand jury.
In the leading case of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. V.
United States," involving criminal antitrust violations,
the Supreme Court held the law pertaining to the disclosure
of grand jury minutes unaffected by the Jencks Act :8
It appears to us clear that Jencks v. United States ... is in nowise
controlling here. It had nothing to do with grand jury proceedings
and its language was not intended to encompass grand jury minutes.
Likewise, it is equally clear that Congress intended to exclude
those minutes from the operation of the so-called Jencks Act .... 69
Because of the veil of secrecy which guards grand jury
proceedings, Pittsburgh Plate Glass held that grand jury
minutes need only be made available to the defense upon
a showing that "'a particularized need' exists for the minutes
which outweighs the policy of secrecy." 7
Most circuits adhere to the "particularized need" ap-
proach; and to satisfy the "particularized need" production
prerequisite, a defendant must often, though not always,7'
make a preliminary showing of inconsistency between the
witness's grand jury and trial testimony. The second circuit,
however, discarded the "particularized need" test in favor
of a more liberal discovery rule. In United States v.
Giampa,7' that court announced:
If it is . . . established at the trial that the witness has testified
before the Grand Jury and defense counsel requests that the trial
court examine the minutes for inconsistencies in testimony given
upon the trial and before the Grand Jury, the trial court should
read the minutes and if inconsistencies be found should make such
portions of the minutes available to defense counsel.73
67360 U.S. 395 (1959).
ca Though Justice Clark wrote in Pittsburgh Plate Glass for a strongly
divided Court, the division did not involve the inapplicability of the Jencks
Act to grand jury minutes-on that point, the Court was in total agreement.
"As the Court points out, discovery of grand jury minutes is not affected
by the Jencks statute . . . ." Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,
360 U.S. 395, 403 n.2 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
69 Id. at 398.
70 Id. at 400. See also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S.
677 (1958); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
Cf. FED. R. CRimi. P. 6(e).
72 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, supra note 68, at 400-01.
72290 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961).
7Id. at 85.
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Under Giampa, therefore, it is mandatory upon the trial
court, assuming a proper foundation has been laid, to ex-
amine gTand jury transcripts for possible inconsistencies and
to disclose to the defendant any portions of the minutes
containing inconsistencies. 4
Brady's impact upon the disclosure of grand jury
minutes is already somewhat discernible. 5  Certain cases
framing the general constitutional disclosure duty (not re-
lating to the producibility of grand jury minutes), for ex-
ample, have drawn upon liberal second circuit grand jury
decisions for authority."6 Other cases have expressed the
view that due process requires a prosecutor to inform the
court or the defense counsel of grand jury testimony which
would aid in exculpating the accused. 7 But Brady's real
potential thrust in this area would be felt by the judicial
recognition, as an element of due process, of the prosecutorial
obligation to reveal those portions of a witness's grand jury
testimony which are inconsistent with his trial testimony--
and a recent second circuit case, United States ex rel. Biind
v. La-Valee7S expressly noticed Brady's likely effect.
Bund had been convicted of larceny in a New York
State court. At his trial, the court examined the victim-
witness's grand jury testimony and, concluding that it con-
formed to the trial testimony, denied the defendant access
to the minutes. Following conviction, Bund petitioned the
federal courts for redress, alleging deprivation of his
74 Judges within the circuit have differed, however, over whether the
"harmless error" doctrine, firmly imbedded in the Jencks procedure, should
be applied to cases where trial courts fail to perform correctly the duty
imposed upon them by Giampa. See United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d
373, 382 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961). Compare the
Giampa opinion with United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1961).
For a discussion of the applicability of the "harmless error" rule to Jencks
and Brady discovery, see the next subsection of the instant article.
75 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bund v. LaVallee, 344 F.2d 313 (2d
Cir. 1965); Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 34
F.R.D. 87 (1964).
76 See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 343 F.2d 49, 53-54 (9th Cir.
1965), citing and quoting United States v. Zborowski, supra note 66, a leading
case on the discovery of grand jury transcripts.
77 See United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir.
1964) (construing broadly the holding of Application of Kapatos, 208 F.
Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)).
78 344 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1965).
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constitutional rights. The case was disposed of at the circuit
level, that court agreeing with the New York trial court
that the minutes contained nothing of value to the de-
fendant."9 The court, therefore, was not specifically called
upon to decide whether the governmental withholding of
materially inconsistent grand jury minutes would be con-
stitutionally offensive. Nonetheless, the Bmnd discussion
of the problem is enlightening:
The absence of a constitutional requirement that Grand Jury testi-
mony of a witness must always be made available to the defense
does not necessarily mean that it never need be. It could be
argued with some force that when the Grand Jury testimony is
exculpatory and the trial testimony inculpatory, or even when
both are inculpatory but so inconsistent as to cast serious doubt
on the veracity of the witness, failure to make the Grand Jury
testimony available on request is within the principle of the de-
cisions holding it to be a denial of due process for the prosecutor
to fail to disclose known exculpatory evidence to the defense.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d
215 (1963); Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964);
United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir.
1963). Whether a state could justify non-disclosure of Grand
Jury testimony of that character against due process attack on
the basis of the historic policy of preserving the secrecy of Grand
Jury testimony is an issue on which the Supreme Court has yet
to speak s
Bund noted explicitly that the second circuit Giampa
procedure is not constitutionally mandated."1 But if the
7 The court also found nothing constitutionally improper with New
York's refusal to apply retroactively the doctrine of People v. Rosario, 9
N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 866 (1961)
-New York's judicially manufactured "Jencks" type rule under which, in the
words of Bund, "a prior statement of a witness, including his testimony
before a Grand Jury, should be made available to the defense for possible
use on cross-examination." United States ex rel. Bund v. LaVallee, supra
note 75, at 315.
80 United States ex rel. Bund v. LaVallee, supra note 75, at 315. On
the rule of secrecy, see Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable
Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REv. 66S (1962). The changed composition
of the Supreme Court will doubtlessly affect its attitude toward the secrecy
rule. In that regard, it should be noted that all four dissenters in Pittsburgh
Plate Glass are presently on the Court: the Chief Justice, and Justices Brennan,
Black and Douglas. It should also be noted that where a witness's prior
sworn testimony is used to attack his credibility, his impeachment will be
enhanced. See United States v. Zborowski, supra note 66, at 667.
sl "Although this Circuit requires its own trial judges to examine the
Grand Jury testimony of witnesses who give evidence at a criminal trial
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Brady rule is applied to grand jury testimony, the logical
result, dictated by caution, would be the adoption of a
Giarmpa-type proceeding whereby courts could impartially at-
tempt to assess the usefulness to defendants of grand jury
minutes. In some respects, moreover, the constitutional dis-
closure duty cases might liberalize discovery in the grand
jury testimony area even beyond Giampa-a defense founda-
tion and "request" that the court examine the minutes might
be held unnecessary,' and the improper withholding of grand
jury transcripts from the defense might, where a constitu-
tional right is involved, be less likely to be termed "harmless
error.""
Remedy for Non-Production and the "Harmless Error"
Doctrine
Since 1959, when Rosenberg v. United States84 was de-
cided by the Supreme Court, the "harmless error" doctrine
has been entrenched in the Jencks Act discovery process.
Justice Brennan, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Black and Douglas, dissenting in Rosenberg, did not spurn
altogether the application of the "harmless error" doctrine
in a Jencks Act setting; instead, the Rosenberg dissenters
suggested a different approach to the rule-a presumption of
harmful error:
Although we need not go so far as those courts which have sug-
gested that the harmless error doctrine can never apply as to state-
ments producible under the statute . . . fidelity to the principle
underlying Jencks and the Jencks statute requires, I think, that
when the defense has been denied a statement producible under
the statute, an appellate court should order a new trial unless the
circumstances justify the conclusion that a finding that such a denial
and makes this available to the defense where inconsistencies exist ...
there has been no hint that this procedure was thought to be compelled by
the due process clause of the fifth amendment" United States ex rel. Bund v.
LaVallee, supra note 75, at 314-15.
82 See notes 54-65 stpra, and accompanying text.
83 Moreover, since a statement need not be flatly contradictory to a
witness's trial testimony in order to be useful for impeachment purposes,
(see note 35 supra), Brady would require trial courts to examine grand
jury minutes for more than mere inconsistencies; a court's refusal to disclose
minutes to a defendant might result in a new trial if an appellate court were
to find the minutes in some way useful to the defense.
84360 U.S. 367 (1959).
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was harmful error would be clearly erroneous. In that determina-
tion, appellate courts should be hesitant to take it upon themselves
to decide that the defense could not have effectively utilized a
producible statement.8 5
The imposition of the "harmless error" rule on the
Jencks Act means, in essence, that, despite the philosophical
foundation of the act (i.e., that only the defense attorney
is adequately equipped to assess the usefulness of a witness's
statement), a defendant is entitled only to those documents
which, in an appellate court's opinion, actually contain mat-
ter useful to the defense,86 and then only if the court feels
the defendant was prejudiced by the non-disclosure. Iron-
ically, in the one area where the Jencks Act contemplated
discovery broader than that required by Brady-the auto-
matic disclosure of authenticated documents irrespective
of their actual impeachment value-the courts have con-
stricted the act's meaning.
As might be expected, the remedy for non-production
under the constitutional disclosure duty cases surpasses that
of the Jencks Act "harmless error" rule. At one time, the
rule accepted by Judge Friendly in Kyle v. United States 
87
was thought to govern."8 Kyle contrasted
the rule that the knowing use of perjured testimony requires
reversal even though prejudice is not affirmatively shown, with 'the
area of passive nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence, in which
prejudice is the central matter of inquiry and the evidence not
disclosed is subjected to a critical examination to determine
whether it is reasonably likely *that a different result would have
been reached had the exculpatory evidence been made available.'8 "
The Kyle "balancing test," " except with regard to
instances of prosecutorial guile, seems even more restrictive
sr5Id. at 375-76 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
B6 See United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 919 (1961).
8 Supra note 66.
88 See Application of Kapatos, supra note 77, at 888.
s8 Kyle v. United States, supra note 66, at 513.
90 "The conclusion we draw from all this is that the standard of how
serious the probable effect of an act or omission at a criminal trial must
be in order to obtain the reversal or, where other requirements are met, the
vacating of a sentence, is in some degree a function of the gravity of the
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than an ordinary "harmless error" rule. Brady and other
cases decided subsequent to Kyle, however, indicate that the
"passive non-disclosure" aspect of Kyle is no longer the law.9
First of all, Brady makes clear that passive non-disclosure of
evidence favorable to an accused violates due process even
when the prosecutor withholds the evidence in complete
good faith.2  Moreover, in Pahy v. Connecticut,93 a case
involving the use of illegally seized evidence in violation of
the defendant's constitutional rights, the Supreme Court,
finding it unnecessary "to decide whether the erroneous ad-
mission of evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure
can ever be subject to the normal rules of 'harmless error'
• 94 applied a standard resembling the "presumption of
harmful error" test advocated in the Jencks Act area by the
Rosenberg dissenters: "The question is whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction.' 9
It may be that, over the vigorous objections of Justices
Harlan, Clark, Stewart and White, who dissented in Fahy,
the Supreme Court, when squarely presented with the issue,
will accept the -view often expressed by the late Judge
Jerome Frank-that an error invading constitutional riglits
can under no circumstances be deemed "harmless. "?96 At
the least, it may be expected that the Court will, as it did
in Fahy, presume harmful error whenever rights guaranteed
by the Constitution are infringed. That seems to be what
act or omission; the strictness of the application of the harmless error
standard seems somewhat to vary, and its reciprocal, the required showing
of prejudice, to vary inversely, with the degree to which the conduct of
the trial has-violated basic concepts of fair play." Id. at 514.
9 Indeed, the very circuit that announced the Kyle rule has seemingly
indicated its awareness that the law has changed. See Uniied States ex rel.
Meers v. Wilkins, supra note 77, at 139 n.2. "Since the state offered no
explanation for the failure to disclose the evidence, we need not consider
whether the withholding of material evidence may be excused."
92 See text accompanying note 19 supra, for the language employed by
the Brady Court. See also text accompanying note 22 supra, quoting from
Thomas v. United States, 343 F.2d 49, 53 (9th Cir. 1965).
93 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
94 Id. at 86. (Emphasis added.)
9s Id. at 86-87.99
,Cahn, Fact-Skepticisin and Fundamental Law, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 16-17
(1958).
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was done by the fourth circuit, in Barbee v. Warden,97
with respect to the constitutional right to evidentiary dis-
closure." Since the constitutional disclosure duty applies
to witnesses' pretrial statements containing information use-
ful to defendants for impeachment purposes, it seems the
Rosenberg dissenters may have won their battle."
CONCLUSION
Brady's cumulative effect upon Jencks would be drastic-
it would "amend" section 3500 in the following manner:
after a Government witness has testified on direct examina-
tion, the Government, to avert the reversal or the setting
D7 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) ; cf. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye,
supra note 65, at 767.
98 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964). The Barbee court discussed the Kyle
test, but presumably rejected it in favor of a Ptahy-type rule. Barbee noted:
"Involved is a question of fundamental fairness rising to the level of con-
stitutional due process which cannot be brushed aside as a mere error in an
evidentiary ruling:' Id. at 847.
DD In one other respect, Brady's remedy for non-production seems to exceed
the Jencks Act. In Campbell v. United States I, 365 U.S. 85, 98 (1961), the
Supreme Court expressly refused to rule whether the innocent, good faith de-
struction by the Government of Jencks documents should be equated with non-
compliance (the Government conceded that destruction for improper motives, or
in bad faith, with the purpose of suppressing evidence should be so equated).
Justice Frankfurter, however, for those concurring in part and dissenting in
part, expressed the view that the act did not require the preservation of
such documents. Id. at 102. See also Killian v. United States, 368 U.S.
231, 242 (1961). Lower courts seem to have aligned themselves with Justice
Frankfurter's position. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States II, 303 F.2d 747,
751 (1st Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 373 U.S. 487 (1963) (indicating
that it would express no view on the first circuit destruction-of-notes rule);
Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 1962) ; United States v.
Annunziato, supra note 74, at 382; United States v. Thomas, 282 F.2d 191,
194 (2d Cir. 1960) (by implication). Moreover, the general view seems
to be that if Jencks documents have been innocently destroyed, a defendant
is entitled to "secondary evidence" of a witness's pretrial statement not as
a matter of right, but only in the discretion of the trial court. Ogden v.
United States, supra, at 249-50: "When a producible statement has been
innocently destroyed the court mnay require the Government to furnish the
information contained in the destroyed statement from a source which would
not otherwise be subject to discovery." (Emphasis added.) Accord, United
States v. Thomas, supra, at 195: "Whether the report shown to defendant's
counsel was within the terms of Section 3500 is not in issue. The trial judge
properly exercised his discretion in favor of the defendants in permitting them
to have the report." (Emphasis added.) But see United States v. An-
nunziato, supra note 74, at 382. Under Brady, of course, if a Jencks document
has been destroyed, and if the Government is in possession of secondary
information useful to the accused, it would seem obligatory upon the prosecutor
to reveal it, regardless of its form.
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aside of a prospective conviction, must disclose, even without
a prior defense demand, all statements (authenticated, un-
authenticated, grand jury minutes, etc.) in its possession
which contain information bearing disfavorably upon the
credibility of that witness, even if those statements do not
technically relate to the subject matter of the witness's direct
examination testimony!
Such a drastic alteration should be arrived at, if at all,
only after careful deliberation, and with due regard for the
fact that the rules, being of a constitutional origin, will
also be binding upon the states via the fourteenth amendment.
Though the cases have encroached increasingly upon the
Jencks Act discovery domain, the courts have not analyzed
their decisions in terms of their impact on section 3500.
Perhaps pretrial statements are sufficiently different
from other forms of evidence so as to warrant, in some
respects, a different set of discovery rules. Requiring a
demand as a prerequisite to receiving a witness's pretrial
statements, for instance, may not be too great a burden
for the accused to shoulder; a request in that setting is
clearly distinguishable from requiring a defense request for
the production of information about which the defendant
is ignorant. Other examples could, of course, be given.
Regardless of the ultimate result, all that is asked is that
the courts consciously come to grips with the problem and
avoid a purely mechanical transplantation of Brady rules to
situations involving the producibility of witnesses' pretrial
documents. An area such as Jencks Act discovery is far
too important and far too controversial to be nullified
sub silentio.
APPENDIX
§ 3500. Demands for production of statements and reports
of witnesses.
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United
States, no statement or report in the possession of the United
States which was made by a Government witness or pros-
pective Government witness (other than the defendant) to
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an agent of the Government shall be the subject of subpoena,
discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on
direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has
testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion
of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the
possession of the United States which relates to the subject
matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire
contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter
of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to
be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination
and use.
(c) If the United States claims that any statement
ordered to be produced under this section contains matter
which does not relate to the subject matter of the testimony
of the witness, the court shall order the United States to
deliver such statement for the inspection of the court in
camera. Upon such delivery the court shall excise the
portions of such statement which do not relate to the subject
matter of the testimony of the witness. With such material
excised, the court shall then direct delivery of such state-
ment to the defendant for his use. If, pursuant to such
procedure, any portion of such statement is withheld from
the defendant and the defendant objects to such withholding,
and the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt
of the defendant, the entire text of such statement shall
be preserved by the United States and, in the event the
defendant appeals, shall be made available to the appellate
court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the
ruling of the trial judge. Whenever any statement is de-
livered to a defendant pursuant to this section, the court
in its discretion, upon application of said defendant, may
recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may
determine to be reasonably required for the examination
of such statement by said defendant and his preparation
for its use in the trial.
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with
an order of the court under paragraph (b) or (c) hereof
to deliver to the defendant any such statement, or such
196]
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portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall
strike from the record the testimony of the witness, and the
trial shall proceed unless the court in its discretion shall
determine that the interests of justice require that a mistrial
be declared.
(e) The term "statement," as used in subsections (b),
(c), and (d) of this section in relation to any witness called
by the United States, means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness and
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him;
or
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other
recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a sub-
stantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by
said witness to an agent of the Government and re-
corded contemporaneously with the making of such oral
statement.
